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Less advanced sectors
in the Latin American
fertility transition
Susana Schkolnik and Juan Chackiel
Demographic change in Latin America has been driven by the
behaviour of the middle and upper strata. Given that fertility and mortality
in these groups are now relatively low, future changes will mainly come
from the behaviour of less advanced sectors. This paper analyses the
contribution of these less advanced groups to the decline in fertility,
distinguishing between the “distribution effect” and the “rates effect”. In
less advanced sectors the desired number of children is lower than the
actual number, with early marriage and limited use of modern
contraceptives continuing to be the rule. Even so, these groups have
entered the demographic transition. A number of countries have recently
seen falls in their fertility rates due to the contribution of women with low
levels of education: in the late transition countries behaviour is
heterogeneous, while in the advanced transition countries the greatest
contribution is being made by women with primary education.
Susana Schkolnik
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It is generally acknowledged by those studying
population issues that rather than just a transition,
which describes changes in the components of a
population, it makes sense to speak of transitions, and
this holds true for the particular case of fertility. It is valid
for Latin America as a region, owing to the variations
between countries, and also when each country is
considered separately, as demographic behaviour varies
between social sectors and places of residence.
Changes in the behaviour of a country’s
demographic variables are the result, then, of what
happens within each sector, while at the same time they
are affected by the movement of people between
sectors, i.e., by social mobility. Thus, for example,
when there is upward mobility, resulting in a larger
percentage of the population behaving in a way
characteristic of middle and upper sectors, the
transition will advance, even though behaviour may not
necessarily have changed within any of the social
groups. The relative weight of these two factors has
been shifting, however. Because demographic changes
have largely been associated with the behaviour of the
middle and upper strata, there is an expectation that
future tendencies will be associated chiefly with what
happens in the groups that are less advanced in the
transition. These groups have now shown unmistakable
signs of having commenced their own transition. The
basis for this claim is that the transition has tended to
continue over the last two decades despite economic
stagnation which in many countries has actually
increased the percentage of people living in poverty.
It is difficult, however, to establish precisely what the
determining factors are in this process.
As a result of this situation it has been suggested,
for example, that there may be a fertility transition
model specific to low-income social groups, differing
from the nineteenth-century European model and from
that followed by the middle and upper sectors of Latin
America during the first half of the twentieth century.
While economic and social development seems to have
been the contextual key to the transition in these latter,
it may be that the continuous declines seen recently
among low-income strata in the Latin American
countries are better explained by the pressure of
economic need, heightened at times of crisis.
Factors of both types have probably had a large
influence. Although the crises of recent decades in
Latin America might have caused fertility to decline,
poor sectors have probably been influenced too by the
general process of development in the region. Although
development has not translated in recent years into
better incomes, employment and living conditions for
certain sectors of the population (in some cases, things
have worsened), it has been reflected in other aspects,
such as the expansion of education and health care, the
growth of communications, greater economic
participation by women, and thence the emergence of
new attitudes towards procreation associated with the
use of modern family planning methods. The argument
that the fall in fertility in poor sectors has largely been
due to overall development is supported by the fact that
in some better-developed countries this decline began
before the crisis of the 1980s.
Consideration has also been given to the fact that
once the demographic transition has begun (in
association with the development aspects referred to),
demographic variables, along with other related social
indicators such as education and health care, acquire a
degree of inertia that makes them, by their nature and
characteristics, relatively independent of short-term
movements in the economy. Consequently, it is feasible
to alter the behaviour of these variables by means of
specific social policies, something that would also help
explain why their downward tendency continues during
periods of crisis.
It is well known that the transition begins latest
in the lower social strata, whose members are poor and
relatively uneducated. This situation is found in rural
areas where most of the population lives under these
conditions, in deprived urban populations and in
indigenous populations, where poverty is compounded
by cultural and linguistic barriers to health and family
planning information.
   This article is based, with updated information, on the document
“Latin America: Less advanced groups in demographic transition”,
which the authors presented at the International Population
Conference (Beijing, October 1997) of the International Union for
the Scientific Study of Population. For an expanded version of that
document, see Schkolnik and Chackiel (1998).
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Although there are studies analysing differences
in mortality and fertility between social sectors, these
are restricted in scope and are not always comparable
between countries and over time. The information
available for identifying longer-term trends generally
stratifies the population in two ways: by place of
residence (urban/rural) and by the mother’s level of
education (number of years’ schooling or stage reached
in the education system).
To study what is happening with the fertility
trends of less advanced sectors, and what contribution
they are making to demographic change in the
countries, the evolution of the total fertility rate and
proximate determinants will be analysed by the
mother’s level of schooling, since this variable has
great discriminatory power (Cleland, 2002; Cleland and
Rodríguez, 1988; United Nations, 1995; Weinberger,
Lloyd and Blanc, 1989). A multivariate analysis
applied in the United Nations study cited shows that
in Latin America the inverse relationship between the
mother’s education and her fertility has proved to be
stronger than any other. Almost all the regression
coefficients are the highest and most significant
statistically, after geographical and sociodemographic
variables have been considered. This would seem to
confirm that education is the variable that best captures
fertility differences between sociodemographic and
economic groups. In what follows, women with no or
very little education (0 to 3 years of schooling or
incomplete primary) will be treated as the least
advanced groups in the demographic transition.
The main sources of information are the national
case studies of the World Fertility Survey (WFS),
population censuses and vital statistics for the 1970s,
and the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)1  for
the 1980s and 1990s and for the years closest to 2000.
1
 These surveys are financed by a United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) project and conducted by Macro
International Inc.
II
The demographic and fertility
transition in Latin America
There are numerous studies of the demographic
transition in Latin America that indicate its
peculiarities, chiefly as compared to the European
process.
The pre-transition situation in the early twentieth
century was characterized by life expectancy at birth
E(0) of some 30 years and a total fertility rate (TFR) of
about 6 children (Pérez Brignoli, 1994). One of the
characteristics distinguishing the Latin American pre-
transition from that of Europe is the higher level of
fertility observed, attributed to earlier marriage and a
lower percentage of women remaining single in the
Latin American countries (Zavala de Cosío, 1992).
Mortality was the first indicator to begin falling
in Latin America, slowly in the early part of the
twentieth century, more noticeably from 1930 onward
(Arriaga, 1974), and then universally after the Second
World War. The region attained an average E(0) of 52
years and an infant mortality rate (IMR) of 127 per
thousand in the period 1950-1955 (ECLAC/CELADE,
2004). The greatest progress was made in the next two
decades, with E(0) exceeding 60 in the 1970s. The
region now has an E(0) of 70 (nine countries exceed
this figure) and an IMR of about 33 per thousand.
Fertility declined much later than mortality. As the
second half of the twentieth century began, average
fertility in Latin America was about 6 children per
woman and showed a slightly rising tendency until the
early 1960s. This upward trend in fertility was probably
due to the earlier declines in mortality, which increased
the number of years during which a woman might
become pregnant and was associated with better health
conditions for procreation. The higher marriage rates
seen in the 1950s and 1960s also seem to have been
influential (Zavala de Cosío, 1992). Only in the second
half of the 1960s did any major change take place in
the average number of children per woman, which
began its decline towards the present level of 2.7, less
than half the figure of 35 years ago. This drop
coincided with the so-called second contraceptive
revolution in Europe, i.e., with the spread of modern
contraceptive methods, including sterilization, abortion
also playing what may have been a very important part
in this process. The speed with which fertility fell is
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also at variance with the process followed by the
developed countries, although Latin American fertility
is still higher than theirs. In Europe, particularly,
fertility has fallen to unexpectedly low levels that are
well below replacement rate, something only Cuba has
experienced in the region.
The information currently available on the
demographic and fertility transition in Latin America
indicates that all the countries have now embarked
upon it to a greater or lesser degree. Experiences have
varied greatly, however. Table 1 gives a typology of
the countries, grouping them into categories by their
fertility rates in the middle of the last century and in
the period 1995-2000.
In this way, categories have been created that take
into account the level and trend of fertility in the last
50 years. Whereas 16 of 20 countries in the region had
very high fertility in 1950-1955, in the latest half-
decade none was in this category and 14 were in the
medium-low, low and very low fertility groups. To sum
up, the following situations have been identified:
i) countries that have gone from very high to high
fertility (Guatemala); ii) countries that have gone from
very high to medium-high fertility (five countries);
iii) countries that have gone from very high to
medium-low fertility (nine countries); iv) countries that
have gone from very high to low fertility (Brazil);
v) countries that have gone from high to low fertility
(Chile); vi) countries that have gone from medium-high
to very low fertility (Cuba); vii) countries that
have remained at a medium-low level (Argentina);
viii) countries that have gone from medium-low to low
fertility (Uruguay). Cuba is the only country whose
total fertility rate is below the replacement level.
For this study, the aim was to select countries in
each of the different situations. Paradoxically, this was
not possible for the countries that made the transition
earlier and are furthest advanced with it (Argentina,
Cuba and Uruguay), as information on fertility by
social stratum is not available.
TABLE 1
Latin America: Classification of countries by fertility
level, 1950-1955 and 1995-2000a
(Total fertility rate in these periods)
Fertility Fertility level 1995-2000
level Very high: High: Medium-high: Medium-low: Low: Very low:
1950-1955 5.5 and over 4.5-5.4 3.5-4.4 2.5-3.4 1.8-2.4 under 1.8
Very high: 5.5 Guatemala (5.0) Bolivia (4.4) El Salvador (3.2) Brazil (2.5)
and over Haiti (4.4) Peru (3.2)
Honduras (4.4) Ecuador (3.1)







High: 4.5-5.4 Chile (2.2)
Medium-high: 3.5-4.4 Cuba (1.6)
Medium-low: 2.5-3.4 Argentina (2.6) Uruguay (2.4)
Low: 1.8-2.4
Very low: under 1.8
Source: ECLAC/CELADE (2004).
a The figures in brackets are the total fertility rate (TFR) for 1995-2000.
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III
The fertility transition in less
advanced groups
Not all social groups have participated in the same way
in the fertility shift, which generally began in the mid-
1960s. The data available cover the 1970s, 1980s and
1990s, and in certain cases there is information for
some year around 2000, so that there is enough
material to arrive at some conclusions.
In the 1970s, the total fertility rate of the “no
schooling” group generally remained above 5.5
children per woman. The TFR of women with little
schooling (incomplete primary or 1 to 3 years of
schooling) was lower, but of the same order. The latest
data indicate that, other than in countries with low
fertility, less advanced groups have maintained a TFR
of over 4 children and, in some cases, of over 5.5.
There have been declines even in the countries where
total fertility rates are still high, though, because they
formerly had values of close to 7 children. To sum up,
fertility has recently shifted in the least advanced
groups, but relatively high values persist (table 2, and
see table 3 below).
The fact that most of the groups in table 2
(classified by educational level) fall above the diagonal
reveals a change of categories translating into a fall in
TFR values. This does not hold so true, however, for less
advanced groups in the high-fertility countries, since
about half of the 11 that had “very high” fertility in
the 1970s are still in this category. Nonetheless, three
have moved into the “high” category and three into the
TABLE 2
Latin America (six countries): Classification of groups
by women’s educational level, 1970s and 1995-2000a b
(Total fertility rate)
Fertility Nivel de fecundidad 1995-2000
level Very high: High: Medium-high: Medium-low: Low: Very low:
1950-1955 5.5 and over 4.5-5.4 3.5-4.4 2.6-3.4 1.8-2.5 under 1.8
Very high: 5.5 Honduras-A (7.1) Ecuador-B (5.4) Colombia-A (4.1)
and over Honduras-B (6.1) Honduras-I (4.8) Mexico-B (3.7)
Bolivia-A (7.1) Mexico-A (4.7) Ecuador-I (3.6)
Bolivia-B (5.8)
Ecuador-A (6.2)
High: 4.5-5.4 Colombia-B (3.6) Mexico-I (3.1)
Chile-A (2.8)c
Medium-high: 3.5-4.4 Bolivia-I (4.6) Ecuador-S (2.6) Chile-B (2.4)
Medium-low: 2.6-3.4 Honduras-S (2.9) Colombia-S (2.2)




Very low: under 1.8
Source: Table 3.
a A: no schooling; B: incomplete primary education; I: intermediate education; S: secondary education and above.
b The figures in brackets are the total fertility rate (TFR) for 1995-2000.
c The value of 2.8 for Chile-A represents the functional illiteracy signified by 0-3 years of education.
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TABLE 3
Latin America (eight countries): Relative distribution of the female
population aged 15-49 and total fertility rate (TFR)
(TFR by educational level, various sources)a b
Source 1 Source 2 Source  3 Source 4
Fertility level, country and source (1970s) (1980s)  (1990s) (around 2000)
Women % TFR Women % TFR Women % TFR Women % TFR
Fecundidad alta
Guatemala (DHS 1987. 1995. 1998) – – 100 5.6 100 5.1 100 5.0
Sin instrucción – – 38 7.0 28 7.1 25 7.1
Primaria incompleta – – 35 5.6 47 5.1 49 5.2
Primaria completa – – 12 3.9 – – – –
Secundaria y más – – 15 2.7 25 2.7 25 3.0
Bolivia (censo 1976; DHS 1989.
1994. 1998) 100 6.5 100 4.9 100 4.8 100 4.2
Sin instrucción 43 7.6 18 6.1 12 6.5 8 7.1
Instrucción básica 30 6.5 36 5.9 36 6.0 29 5.8
Instrucción media 12 4.0 16 4.5 16 4.9 14 4.6
Instrucción secundaria y más 15 4.0 30 2.9 36 2.7 49 2.7
Honduras (EDENH 1975. 1983;
ENESF 1991; DHS 1996) 100 7.0 100 6.3 100 5.2 100 4.9
Sin instrucción 42 7.5 24 8.0 15 7.0 12 7.1
1-3 años 28 7.3 26 7.7 26 6.4 23 6.1
4-6 años 23 5.9 28 5.8 35 4.9 37 4.8
7 años y más 7 3.3 22 3.3 24 3.1 28 2.9
Fecundidad media baja
Ecuador (ENF 1979. ENDESA 1987.
ENDEMAIN 1994. 1999) 100 6.6 100 4.3 100 3.6 100 3.3
Sin instrucción 10 8.6 8 6.4 5 6.2 4 5.6
Primaria 55 7.0 48 5.2 43 4.4 40 4.2
Secundaria y más 35 3.5 44 3.0 52 2.8 56 2.6
Superior – – – – 12 2.1 15 1.9
Colombia (ENFC 1976; EPDS 1986; ENDS 1995.
EDS 2000) 100 4.7 100 3.3 100 3.0 100 2.6
Sin instrucción 21 7.1 6 5.4 4 5.0 3 4.1
Primaria 55 5.2 49 4.2 37 3.8 32 3.6
Secundaria y más 24 2.7 45 2.5 59 2.5 50 2.4
Superior – – – – – – 15 1.5
Fecundidad baja
ENADID 1992. 1997) 100 6.3 100 4.7 100 3.5 100 2.7
Sin instrucción 34 7.5 12 7.2 15 5.6 6 4.7
Primaria incompleta 38 6.8 32 5.5 23 4.3 17 3.7
Primaria completa 18 4.6 19 4.2 20 3.2 22 3.1
Secundaria y más 10 3.2 37 3.0 42 2.4 55 2.2
Chile (Censos/registros 1970. 1982. 1992) 100 3.9 100 3.0 100 2.5 – –
0-3 años 31 5.3 13 3.9 7 2.8 – –
4-6 años 28 4.4 25 3.4 17 2.4 – –
7-9 años 10 3.4 35 2.9 24 2.4 – –
10 años y más 31 2.5 27 2.3 52 2.4 – –
Brasil (EDS 1986. 1996) – – 100 3.4 100 2.5 – –
Primaria incompleta – – 7 6.5 5 5.0 – –
Primaria completa – – 67 5.1 33 3.3 – –
Secundaria y más – – - 3.1 – 2.4 – –
Superior – – 26 2.5 62 1.6 – –
Source: Schkolnik and Chackiel (1998); national Demographic and Health Surveys, various years, www.measuredhs.com.
a Educational level categories are not necessarily comparable across sources. The table was constructed with a view to making categories
consistent for the sources of a given country.
b DHS: Demographic and Health Surveys; EDENH: Encuesta Demográfica Nacional de Honduras; ENADID: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica
Demográfica; END: Encuesta Nacional Demográfica; ENDEMAIN: Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Maternal e Infantil; ENDESA: Encuesta
Demográfica y de Salud Familiar; ENDS: Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud; ENESF: Encuesta Nacional de Epidemiología y Salud
Familiar; ENF: Encuesta Nacional de Fecundidad; ENFC: Encuesta Nacional de Fecundidad Colombia; EPDS: Encuesta de Prevalencia,
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“medium-high”. Of the three that were in the “high”
category, meanwhile, one has moved down into the
“medium-high” and the other two into the “medium-
low” category. It also transpires that the least advanced
groups in the countries that are furthest ahead in the
transition generally had lower fertility in the initial
period, and in Chile they actually attained low fertility
in the recent period. All groups with a higher level of
education are in the medium-low and low fertility
categories, and also show a decline over the period
considered.
According to the general demographic transition
model, as has been seen, fertility also appears to have
started falling among the least advanced groups and,
as expected, this decline seems to have begun later than
the decline in mortality. This sequence can be
appreciated in the study by Schkolnik and Chackiel
(1998). The demographic imbalance created by
mortality declining in relation to fertility, which has
been seen at the outset of other demographic transition
processes (Zavala de Cosío, 1992), is also found in this
case. Large falls in childhood mortality may follow on
once the fertility shift has been triggered, mainly
because of biological factors (longer average interval
between births, fewer births at high-risk ages, lower
parity). Thus, the interplay between these variables
appears to produce a powerful downward tendency in
them both.
The information available is fragmentary and does
not show clearly whether the fertility decline in less
advanced sectors was preceded by an increase, as
happened at the national level in most of the region’s
countries during the 1950s (Chackiel and Schkolnik,
1992). This phenomenon has been detected in some
countries, however, albeit in differing form. For
example, a 1987 survey in Haiti shows total fertility
rates higher than those of the past in all social groups,
and Honduras displays an increase in the groups that
were least advanced in the 1970s (table 3 and figure 1).
The likelihood at present is that the decline in mortality,
particularly among infants, is enhancing the factors that
bear down on fertility rather than those that tend to
increase it, as the motives and mechanisms needed to
limit the number of children are in place to a greater
extent. It is also possible that the increase occurred
before the period analysed, in some cases in conjunction
with what happened in the country as a whole during
the period 1950-1960. A study by Guzmán and
Rodríguez (1993) appears to confirm this through its
analysis of pre-transitional fertility trends by place of
residence. The authors link this development to rising
marriage rates in the 1950s, better sanitary conditions
and the economic expectations of couples.
Figure 1 shows, although the information
available is unsatisfactory, that the gap in total fertility
rates by the mother’s educational level has risen or
remained stable in the countries that are least advanced
in the transition. This is the situation illustrated here
by Honduras and Bolivia. In the case of countries that
are further advanced in the transition, such as Mexico,
Colombia and above all Chile, however, a tendency
towards convergence is seen, owing to a sharper
decline in the fertility of less advanced groups. These
have scope for reducing their total fertility rate, while
more highly educated groups have already attained low
rates and further declines will probably be small. Infant
mortality among their children apparently fell early in
the twentieth century, and their fertility is likely to have
declined in the years following the Second World War.
In summary, as already mentioned and as exemplified
in figure 1, the decline in fertility by social stratum in
these latter countries might be expected to result in a
general tendency towards convergence at low values.
Data from certain Demographic and Health
Surveys of the late 1990s and early 2000s give an idea
of what has happened recently with trends in both
fertility and infant mortality. As already pointed out,
a number of studies have formulated hypotheses
concerning the effect that the crisis has had on these
variables. In particular, the belief is that the crisis and
economic adjustment measures did not halt the decline
either in infant mortality or in fertility, and that
demographic changes have become detached from the
development process. Furthermore, the crisis increased
the desire to have fewer children, owing to the
difficulty of ensuring a good upbringing. This being
so, fertility is expected to carry on declining among the
less advanced groups. The data show that the behaviour
of the different social sectors has been heterogeneous.
For example, the recent trend in the average number
of children shows that the less advanced sectors have
generally continued with this process, although less
rapidly than in the past in a number of cases. In sectors
with higher levels of education, the total fertility rate
is tending to stabilize, usually at values that are still
higher than those seen in the developed world, although
low-fertility countries in the region have now attained
rates close to or below the replacement level (table 3).
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IV
The contribution of less advanced groups
to national demographic transitions
FIGURE 1
Latin America (six countries): Total fertility rate, by mothers’ educational level,





























































































This section will analyse changes in fertility attributable
to factors of two types, seeking to identify the
importance of each of them. These factors are, firstly,
changes in a population’s social mobility (using as a
proxy the proportion of women of child-bearing age
in the different groups categorized by educational
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level) and, secondly, changes in fertility rates that take
place within each educational group, and thus are not
attributable to social mobility.
On the one hand, then, there is the possible impact
of changes in the educational profile of a population
on its average fertility, i.e., how much the fertility rate
varies with changes in the educational structure of a
population in the absence of any alterations in fertility
attributable to other factors within each group. For
example, at time 2 a population might have a larger
proportion of women with an intermediate or high level
of education than at time 1, which is the kind of shift
implicit in social mobility. If women conform to the
fertility of the group they are in, fertility will fall just
because women with more education make up a larger
proportion of the total population.
On the other hand, fertility rates are affected by
other factors that operate within groups and have no
relation to the distribution of women by social stratum
or educational level. In this case, a population’s fertility
rate might change between time 1 and time 2 even in
the absence of any educational progress (in the case
of women of child-bearing age). This could be due to
a larger supply of contraceptives, the implementation
of family planning policies, or indeed the adoption by
women in the least advanced groups of new
reproductive patterns for other reasons, perhaps in
response to a period of economic crisis.
To carry out this analysis, recourse has been had
to a typification (standardization) procedure used in
Weinberger and others (1989), which showed the
important contributions made by both factors in the
experience of four Latin American countries in the 1970s
and 1980s. In the present paper, as in a previous work
(Schkolnik and Chackiel, 1998), the same procedure has
been applied to a larger number of countries, this time
including information from more recent periods. The
exercise gives an overall idea of the contribution from
the two factors specified, but it is not robust when
variations in the total fertility rate are very small, since
the sensitivity of the results to minor inaccuracies in the
estimates could lead to faulty conclusions.
Table 4 shows the change in fertility attributable
to the educational profile of women (the “distribution
effect”) and the change within groups attributable to
other factors (the “rates effect”), displaying both the
absolute contribution (magnitude) and the percentage
contribution of each to the total change in the rate
between two times.
To calculate the weight of the “distribution effect”
and the “rates effect”, the following procedure was used.
First, the following total fertility rates were calculated:
— TFR(1), the total fertility rate at time 1 (combination
of the rates for the different educational groups
at time 1, weighted by the proportion of each
group in the total at time 1).
— TFR(2), total fertility rate at time 2 (combination
of the rates for the different educational groups
at time 2, weighted by the proportion of each
group in the total at time 2).
— TFR(HE), hypothetical total fertility rate arrived at
by combining the rates for the different educational
groups at time 1, weighted by the proportion of
each group in the total at time 2.
— TFR(HT), hypothetical total fertility rate arrived at
by combining the rates for the different
educational groups at time 2, weighted by the
proportion of each group in the total at time 1.
Using these four rates, the following comparisons
were made:
— TFR(2) – TFR(1) = total real change between time 1
and time 2;
— TFR(HE) – TFR(1) = change that would have occurred
if the educational profile alone had altered.
— TFR(HT) – TFR(1) = change that would have
occurred if the fertility rates of each educational
group were the only variable to have altered.
In turn, the ratio
(TFR(HE) – TFR(1))/(TFR(2) – TFR(1))
indicates the proportion of the total change attributable
to the effect of education alone, termed the
“distribution effect”. Analogously, the change expected
when the only alteration is in the rates of each group
(the “rates effect”) is calculated:
(TFR(HT) – TFR(1))/(TFR(2) – TFR(1))
The sum of the two effects may be slightly
different from 1 owing to the interaction of the two
factors.
The calculations made bore out the findings of
Weinberger and others (1989): both factors play a very
important role in countries’ fertility changes, and the
contribution of the “rates effect” would seem, in most
of them, to be greater than that of the “distribution
effect”, especially in cases where low fertility has
already been attained. The results, which appear in
table 4, are illustrated for three countries in figure 2.
It can be seen from the table that this is generally the
outcome in Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia and Chile,
with some exceptions in Mexico and Colombia.
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TABLE 4
Latin America (six countries): Contribution of the “rates effect”,
the “distribution effect” and fertility changes within each group
to the change in the total fertility rate (TFR)a b
Country and sources Fertility
1970s 1980s Around 2000
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage
contrib. contrib. contrib. contrib. contrib. contrib.
Bolivia (Censo 1976; EDS 1989,1994, 1998)
“Efecto tasas” -0.9 62 0.1 -97 -0.1 10
“Efecto distribución” -0.8 50 -0.2 166 -0.4 89
Grupos:
Sin instrucción -1.5 55 0.4 -64 0.6 -120
Básico -0.6 24 0.1 -38 -0.2 130
Intermedio 0.5 -8 0.4 -68 -0.3 90
Medio o más -1.1 29 -0.2 70 0.0 0
Honduras (EDENH 1975. 1983; EDS 1991/92. 1996)
“Efecto tasas” 0.3 -58 -0.9 80 -0.1 44
“Efecto distribución” -0.7 138 -0.2 23 -0.2 55
Grupos:
Sin instrucción 0.5 -67 -1.0 23 0.1 -9
1 a 3 años de instrucción 0.4 -44 -1.3 39 -0.3 50
4 a 6 años -0.1 11 -0.9 33 -0.1 24
7 años o más 0.0 0 -0.2 5 -0.2 35
Ecuador (EMF 1979. EDS 1987. Enc.1994. 1999)
“Efecto tasas” -1.4 86 -0.5 73 -0.2 74
“Efecto distribución” -0.3 21 -0.2 32 -0.1 28
Grupos:
Sin instrucción -2.2 15 -0.2 1 -0.6 12
1 a 6 años de instrucción -1.8 70 -0.8 90 -0.2 38
7 años o más -0.5 15 -0.2 9 -0.2 50
México (EMF 1976/77. Enc. 1982. 1992. 1997)
 “Efecto tasas” -0.7 39 -1.0 92 -0.4 56
“Efecto distribución” -1.0 66 -0.1 25 -0.4 57
Grupos:
Sin instrucción -0.3 11 -1.6 22 -0.9 27
Primaria incompleta -1.3 70 -1.2 34 -0.6 34
Primaria completa -0.4 13 -1.0 22 -0.2 12
Más que primaria -0.2 6 -0.6 22 -0.2 27
Colombia (EMF 1976. EDS 1986. 1995. 2000)
“Efecto tasas” -1.0 64 -0.2 52 -0.3 76
“Efecto distribución” -0.8 54 -0.3 62 -0.1 24
Grupos:
Sin instrucción -1.7 28 -0.4 10 -0.9 11
Primaria -1.0 64 -0.4 90 -0.2 24
Secundaria o más -0.2 8 0.0 0 -0.3 65
Chile (Censo y registros 1970. 1982 y 1992)
“Efecto tasas” -0.8 83 -0.5 96 – –
“Efecto distribución” -0.3 34 -0.3 44 – –
Grupos:
0 a 3 años de instrucción -1.4 42 -1.1 26 – –
4 a 6 años -1.0 35 -1.0 49 – –
7 a 9 años -0.5 15 -0.5 34 – –
10 años o más -0.2 8 0.1 -9 – –
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of table 3.
a See section IV, fifth paragraph, for a description of the “rates effect” and the “distribution effect”. See also table 3, note b, for the full
names of surveys.
b In Bolivia (1980s) and Honduras (1970s), the contributions calculated for the educational groups are not consistent with the overall results,
owing to inaccuracies in the sources.
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FIGURE 2
Latin America (three countries):
Contribution made by the “rates effect”
and the “distribution effect” to changes
in national fertility levels, by educational
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In the countries that are furthest advanced in the
transition, the “rates effect” increases in the latest
period, this being the result of more widespread
changes in fertility within the different social groups,
and of a lessening of change in the educational
structure. Consequently, something similar is seen
when the differences between countries are examined
in the light of the stage in the transition they are going
through. In Chile, for example, the contribution of the
“rates effect” to the change in the TFR is over 80%,
reaching 96% in the latest period, while in Bolivia and
Honduras it is generally the “distribution effect” that
FIGURE 3
Latin America (three countries):
Contribution made by the rates of each
educational group to changes in national
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predominates. There might be some irregularities in
these two countries owing to deficiencies in the quality
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of the data and the robustness of the exercise, given
the small size of the TFR reduction.
The percentage contribution of each of the groups
by educational level was calculated by taking the
change which had occurred in each educational group
in the period between surveys and weighting it by the
weight of the group as given by the average distribution
by educational level in the two sources considered. The
contribution of each group to the change in fertility is
presented in the same table 4 and illustrated in figure 3.
The greatest contribution to the decline in fertility is
made, on the whole, by the groups with “primary”
education or “1 to 6 years of schooling”. Although in
some cases the largest declines in absolute numbers are
seen among women without schooling, in the advanced
transition countries the contribution of this group to the
drop in fertility is less, owing to their loss of relative
weight in the population following the universalization
of basic education (table 3).
To illustrate what happens in countries in the early
stages of the transition, the cases of Bolivia and
Honduras were taken (table 4). In Bolivia, the greatest
changes in fertility between the 1970s and 1980s were
at the extremes and the greatest contribution to the
decline was made by the “no schooling” group (55%),
which exhibits a larger absolute change and a higher
relative weight. In the 1980s, the data for Bolivia are
affected by the lack of robustness already referred to
as being a potential problem when changes are small,
and this might explain why the “rates effect” tends to
raise fertility. In the latest period (late 1990s) the
greater contribution of women with basic education can
be seen. In Honduras, behaviour is more akin to that
of countries that are further advanced in the transition,
the greatest contributions being made by women with
1 to 6 years of schooling.
To sum up, in recent years the main contributions
to the decline in fertility are no longer found to be due
to groups with high levels of formal education, with
the expectation of this then spreading to others. This is
probably due to the fact that these sectors experienced
the major demographic changes before 1970, even in
countries that were behind in the transition. Seemingly,
current declines in fertility are due primarily to the
contribution of the least educated women, mainly those
who have had basic schooling, since in many countries
women without schooling have come to represent a
very low percentage of the population.
V
The proximate determinants of fertility
As previous sections have shown, the least advanced
social sectors have begun their transition in recent
years, even in high-fertility countries. Notwithstanding
the changes in these groups, their fertility is still high
and they are still socially and economically
disadvantaged. As has been mentioned, furthermore,
the motives and mechanisms giving rise to the
transition in these groups are probably not the same as
in the European model of the nineteenth century and
in the middle and upper sectors of Latin America.
The influence of social changes on fertility is
exercised through a set of proximate determinants that
have to do with exposure to conception, pregnancy and
childbirth (Davis and Blake, 1956; Bongaarts, 1978 and
1982). In what follows, information provided by the
Demographic and Health Surveys and other surveys
will be used to discuss primarily the behaviour of the
proximate determinants that might have had a major
impact on the decline in fertility among the least
advanced groups.
It has been observed that the factors associated
with the fertility decline in European countries might
have been present among more educated women in
Latin America. In Europe, an important role was
played at the outset of the transition by marriage
practices (less frequent and later) and, subsequently,
by the increased prevalence of modern contraceptives
(Zavala de Cosío, 1992).
In Latin America, however, women in the lower
strata seem not to have been following these patterns
where nuptiality is concerned, and to have done so only
partially with contraception. This cannot be attributed
to a desire to have large families, however, since the
number of children they claim to want is not that
different from the ideal family size declared by women
with a higher level of education. Indeed, the ideal
number of children declared in surveys by women from
less advanced groups (table 5) is quite low and, while
systematically higher, does not differ that much from
the number given by more educated women. For
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example, the ideal number of children for women
without schooling is 2.7 in Brazil and Bolivia, 2.9 in
Colombia and Peru, and 3.1 in Ecuador, while among
those with more education it ranges from 2.2 to 2.4 in
the same countries. What this means is that the gaps
between observed and desired fertility in less advanced
groups are large (for example, 5.0 against 2.7 in Brazil,
5.6 against 3.1 in Ecuador, 5.1 against 2.9 in Peru, 7.1
against 2.7 in Bolivia, 6.4 against 3.5 in Haiti). The cases
of Colombia and Peru, for which 1970s data are
available, also show that less educated women did not
always want such small families as they claim to in
recent surveys. It seems that in recent decades there has
been a shift towards a smaller ideal family size among
women in all social groups, including the lowest strata,
although the motives of each group may be different.
The studies that have been done on the main
proximate determinants of fertility (nuptiality,
postpartum infertility, contraception and abortion)
show that contraception is the variable which has been
decisive in bringing down fertility in the region. This
seems to hold true for the least advanced groups, which
have increased their use of contraceptives, including
modern ones. Abortion has been excluded from the
studies owing to lack of information, although there are
indications that it may be playing a major role in all
social sectors (Ferrando, 2003).
Owing to urbanization, the expansion of education,
improvements in the status of women and the efforts of
family planning programmes, among other factors,
information about contraceptives and how to obtain them
has spread widely in the region’s countries and in the
different social groups. By and large, contraceptive use
increases with formal education coverage. Two patterns
of use corresponding to different social sectors can be
distinguished, and these are linked to the level of fertility
in each country (tables 5 and 6). On the one hand there
are countries that generally have high and medium
fertility and where contraceptive behaviour differs
greatly between the groups with the highest level of
education and those with the lowest (e.g., Guatemala,
Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua). On the other
hand, there are the countries, generally with lower
fertility, where contraceptive behaviour differs less
between these groups and where less educated women
have taken up contraception on a larger scale (such as
Brazil and Colombia).
In the first group of countries, the most recent
surveys show a large difference in modern contraceptive
use between women with less and more education
(16% against 54% in Guatemala, for instance, and 8%
against 38% in Bolivia) and a relatively low take-up
of female sterilization, as can be seen in table 6 (11%
against 24% in Guatemala and 4% against 8% in
Bolivia). Generally speaking, this latter method is more
prevalent among more educated women in these
countries. In the second group of countries there is less
difference in modern contraceptive use between more
and less educated women (57% against 75% in Brazil
and 56% against 65% in Colombia), with a high level
of female sterilization in all groups (46% against 36%
in Brazil and 39% against 23% in Colombia), possibly
because family planning programmes emphasize this
method. In the countries where fertility has fallen most,
female sterilization is most prevalent among less
educated women, which has given rise to doubts as to
whether its users have chosen it voluntarily or have
been induced to adopt this method because there are
no other options available or they lack information
about them. This behaviour is probably due in part to
the older age structure of women in the less educated
group, which makes them more likely to have had
recourse to sterilization. More recent generations of
women, by contrast, have had greater access to other
methods of contraception.
To sum up, when uneducated women are
compared between these two groups of countries, the
differences in total fertility rates are found to be
associated with differences in the use of modern
contraceptive methods, chiefly female sterilization.
Certain aspects of reproductive behaviour and the
family size that eventually results are linked to
women’s nuptial behaviour (age at marriage, frequency
of unions, the proportion remaining permanently
single, time spent within unions, etc.).
As mentioned, in the early stages of the fertility
transition in the countries of Western Europe, later
marriage and an increase in the proportion of women
remaining single both had a decisive impact (Zavala
de Cosío, 1992). Likewise, indicators of nuptiality for
women from middle and upper social sectors in Latin
America reveal behaviour which, while it may be less
extreme, is broadly similar. The age at which women
with intermediate or higher education enter their first
union is generally around 24 (table 5), and the
percentage of women who are still single when their
childbearing years are over is higher than in the other
groups. Among less educated women, patterns of
nuptiality have been less influential than contraception
in bringing fertility down. Among more educated
women, on the other hand, these patterns have played
(and are playing) a more important role.
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The indicators of nuptiality derived from the
Demographic and Health Surveys show that
uneducated women are more exposed to conception
than those who are more highly educated, both
because a smaller percentage of them are single and
because they spend more time in unions over similar
periods and enter their first union at an early age. This
age is younger than that at which more educated
women enter their first union, but by contrast with the
previous case, no differences are seen in this respect
between countries with different levels of fertility
(table 5).
The duration of breastfeeding, a fundamental
component of postpartum infertility, has also been
regarded as a very important proximate determinant of
fertility that affects exposure to the risk of pregnancy,
the intervals between births and the final fertility level.
Because breastfeeding prevents ovulation, prolonging
postpartum amenorrhoea, a decline in fertility might be
expected to be associated with longer periods of
breastfeeding.
Prolonged breastfeeding has traditionally been the
ideal in Latin America, emphasis being laid on the
importance of mother’s milk for the health and future
development of the child, particularly in the most
disadvantaged sectors of society. The latest surveys
have revealed some heterogeneity in the reported
duration of breastfeeding, however, which ranges from
a national average of eight months in the Dominican
Republic to 22 months in Peru (table 7).
TABLE 7
Months of breastfeeding by women’s educational level in selected countries
of Latin America at different stages of the demographic transition
Fertility Educational level
level Total No schooling Primary Secondary Higher
TFR Breast- TFR Breast- TFR Breast- TFR Breast- TFR Breast-
feeding feeding feeding feeding feeding
High
Guatemala
DHS 1987 5.6 20.6 7.0 22.9 5.6 20.1 3.3 14.4 – –
DHS 1995 5.1 19.8 7.1 22.2 5.1 19.0 2.7 11.0 1.8 9.6
DHS 1998/99 5.0 19.9 6.8 21.4 5.2 19.0 2.9 13.6 – –
Medium-high
Bolivia
DHS 1989 4.9 16.2 6.1 17.8 5.9 17.3 4.5 15.2 2.9 12.3
DHS 1994 4.8 17.5 6.5 20.7 6.0 18.0 4.9 15.2 2.7 15.1
DHS 1998 4.2 17.5 7.1 20.5 5.8 18.4 4.6 15.8 2.7 15.9
Nicaragua
ESF 1992/93 4.5 12.3 6.8 15.9 4.7 12.2 3.4 9.6 2.4 9.4
DHS 1998 3.9 12.2 6.1 17.6 4.7 14.1 2.7 8.4 1.5 6.0
DHS 2001 3.2 17.0 5.2 20.2 3.8 18.4 2.5 14.7 1.7 9.4
Medium-low
Peru
DHS 1986 4.5 16.3 7.0 – 6.1 – 4.7 – 2.9 –
DHS 1992 3.5 17.3 7.1 21.9 5.1 19.3 3.1 14.8 1.9 10.3
DHS 1996 3.5 19.5 6.9 22.4 5.0 19.9 3.0 19.5 2.1 15.0
DHS 2000 2.9 21.6 5.1 25.4 4.0 21.9 2.4 22.0 1.8 17.4
Dominican
Republic
DHS 1986 3.7 9.4 5.3 12.7 4.3 10.0 2.9 7.2 2.1 6.2
DHS 1991 3.3 5.9 5.2 16.6 3.8 7.1 2.8 5.2 2.6 2.5
DHS 1996 3.2 7.6 5.0 14.2 3.0 9.1 2.6 6.5 1.9 4.4
Colombia
DHS 1986 3.3 11.1 5.4 12.4 4.2 11.9 2.5 9.5 1.5 –
DHS 1990 2.9 8.5 4.9 13.7 3.6 9.4 2.4 7.8 1.6 4.9
DHS 1995 3.0 11.3 5.0 12.2 3.8 12.6 2.6 10.6 1.8 7.8
DHS 2000 2.6 13.1 4.0 9.9 3.6 16.9 2.4 12.6 1.5 6.4
Low
Brazil
DHS 1986 3.4 – 6.5 – 5.1 – 3.1 – 2.5 –
DHS 1996 2.5 7.0 5.0 5.8 3.3 7.6 2.4 6.5 1.6 7.5
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (various years), www.measuredhs.com, and ESF (Encuesta sobre Salud Familiar) in Nicaragua.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 3  •   A U G U S T  2 0 0 4
LESS ADVANCED SECTORS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN FERTILITY TRANSITION • SUSANA SCHKOLNIK AND JUAN CHACKIEL
29
When the average number of months’ breastfeeding
by women’s educational level is observed, Demographic
and Health Survey data show that there are differences
here as there are with the other variables, and that it
tends to diminish as years of education increase. This
behaviour is also seen in other countries and seems to
be a consequence of the faster pace of urban life,
greater involvement by women in work outside the
home, inadequate knowledge of the benefits of
breastfeeding and the easy availability of alternative
foodstuffs. It has been pointed out that one reason for
the decline in breastfeeding is that health institutions
have developed routines and practices which do not
favour it, such as separating mothers from their
newborn children, establishing rigid feeding hours,
using feeding bottles and distributing free samples of
other types of foods (Rodríguez-García, Schaefer and
Yunes, 1990).
Uneducated women breastfeed for longest
(between 10 and 25 months) and no significant changes
have been observed in this variable within each country
over time, which means that it clearly has not been an
influence on changes in fertility levels, at least in the
last few years. The same surveys also show that, among
uneducated women, breastfeeding actually has a shorter
duration in countries with lower fertility, such as
Colombia and the Dominican Republic, than in
countries with higher fertility, such as Guatemala and
Bolivia. Although breastfeeding goes on for longer in
these latter, favouring lower fertility, this is obviously




As with every known demographic transition process,
the least advanced groups in Latin America (taking
women with primary-level education or none as a
proxy) have now also reached the stage of declining
fertility, probably triggered by an earlier drop in infant
mortality. What is more, the fertility of these groups
has fallen in almost all the region’s countries,
irrespective of their stage in the demographic transition
and the fertility level from which they set out or which
they have now reached. Data from the most recent
Demographic and Health Surveys confirm this
development.
In the most advanced transition countries there is
now a discernible tendency for the different social
groups to converge downwards towards low levels,
although there are still differences by education level.
Furthermore, current TFR levels among the least
advanced groups are still high in relation to the regional
average. In high- and medium-fertility countries there
is a substantial gap between groups by educational
level, and the TFR of the less advanced groups has
declined less or, in some cases, even increased. It still
falls into the high-fertility category in these countries,
generally exceeding five children per woman.
Regarding the contribution made by social
mobility and changes within sectors to the decline in
the TFR, the results indicate that both factors were
important in the early stages of the transition (1960s
and 1970s), with the second always preponderating. In
recent years, changes have been associated more with
what has happened within less advanced groups. In the
last decade, declining fertility in the countries has been
mainly due to the contribution of women with a low
level of education. Behaviour has been more
heterogeneous in the countries that are least advanced
in the transition, while in the more advanced ones the
greatest contribution has been more clearly attributable
to women with primary education.
Women in the least advanced groups, whose
desired family size is not far different from that of more
educated women, do not behave like the latter when it
comes to delaying marriage, but continue to marry
early. Contraceptive use has been observed to increase
among them, however, albeit (as was to be expected)
to a lesser extent than among more educated women.
There are differences between the countries observed
in this respect: in lower-fertility countries, the
contraceptive behaviour of women with a low level of
education differs less from that of their more educated
counterparts in terms of their use of modern
contraceptive methods, especially sterilization.
Sterilization is actually used more by less educated
women, perhaps in part because the decision to do so
has not always been wholly voluntary but has been
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 3  •   A U G U S T  2 0 0 4
LESS ADVANCED SECTORS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN FERTILITY TRANSITION • SUSANA SCHKOLNIK AND JUAN CHACKIEL
30
conditioned by lack of access to and information about
other options. In the higher-fertility countries,
contraceptive use is low and this is undoubtedly keeping
the fertility of the least advanced groups high.
To sum up, the drop in infant mortality (mainly
brought about by exogenous factors) would appear to
have triggered the decline in fertility in less advanced
groups, and this has coincided with the expansion of
education, the desire for a smaller number of children
and a larger supply of contraceptives, although access
to these is still very restricted for these sectors. Possible
future declines in infant mortality, which is still high
among these groups, could lead to larger drops in
fertility in future. In the final analysis, however, any
really significant change would seem to depend on how
effectively less educated women can narrow the gap
between the number of children they wish to have and
the number they actually do have.
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